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BOOK REVIEWS
POINTS OF REBELLION. By William 0. Douglas. New York: Random House.
1970. Pp. 97. $4.95.
Rebellion's demand is unity; historical revolution's demand is totality. The
former starts from a negative supported by an affirmative, the latter from
absolute negation and is condemned to every aspect of slavery in order to
fabricate an affirmative that is dismissed until the end of time. One is
creative, the other nihilist. The first is dedicated to creation so as to produce
results in order to negate more and more completely. The historical revolu-
tion is always obliged to act in the hope, which is invariably disappointed, of
one day really existing. Albert Camus, THE REBEL.
For all the turmoil it has caused, Mr. Justice Douglas's latest pamphlet-book,
Points of Rebellion, is a terrible disappointment. While the book is not, as some
of its critics would have it, a call to revolution or even rebellion, it does pretend,
at least in its title, to "declare the causes which impel [or might impel, some]
people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with ['the
Establishment']."' The pretension is just that. One suspects that had the book
been written by anyone other than a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, it would not have been published; some would say that it should not have
been published because it was written by a Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States. Neither point of view is wholly without merit.
Aside from containing much prose which has been kindly described as
"rough hewn" and "stem stuff [which] is not planed down, ' this 97-page Dick-
and-Jane-print primer on the causes of our discontent covers such a variety of
subjects in such a shallow and superficial manner that it could hardly have con-
tributed much to the literature of American politics. And this is unfortunate, for
many if not all of the points which Justice Douglas touches upon are important
and deserve serious analysis. Simply stated, Points of Rebellion purports to dis-
cuss much of importance, but unfortunately does not live up to its promise.
For example, in his first chapter, "How America Views Dissent," Justice
Douglas tells us precious little about how we view dissent. Instead he tells us
that because of a fear "generated" by Joseph McCarthy, "nurtured" by President
Truman and "promoted" by President Johnson (as manifested by congressional
1 Justice Douglas warns that "today's Establishment is the new George III." W.
DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION 95 '(1970). "The Establishment" is one of those wonderful
terms in the American political lexicon which everyone uses but no one cares to define, lest
it include him. Justice Douglas is no different. By way of example, "the Establishment" is
used to describe the police, id. at 5, corporate giants, id. at 12, the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Pentagon, id. at 13, the university-"symbol of the Establishment," -id. at 14, mass
media - "essentially the voice of the Establishment" (Spiro Agnew notwithstanding), id. at
42, the owners of mines in West Virginia, id. at 52, persons in control of the political parties,
d at 53, persons who sit on federal regulatory agencies and the persons they control and
"most elected spokesmen," id. at 89. How much simpler it was in the days of George III when
evil could be attributed to one person.
2 See Clark, Book Review, 83 HAv. L. REv. 1931 (1970). Perhaps that reviewer, former
Justice Tom C. Clark, had the following phrase in mind when he characterized the style as
"rough hewn": ". . . the Constitution was designed to keep government off the backs of the
people" W. DOUGLAS, supra note 1, at 6.
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hearings, government surveillance techniques and practices and personality tests),3
we are now witnessing "a protest against the belittling of man, against his de-
basement, against a society that makes 'lawful' the exploitation of humans."'
While the existence of increased surveillance and personality tests may demon-
strate how we discover, control and regulate "dissent" (which presumably means
thinking or doing whatever "the Establishment" finds objectionable) one never
does learn precisely what is objectionable to "the Establishment."5
Justice Douglas can be forgiven for not being faithful to his chapter headings,
but it would seem that when one chooses to put on the hat of the pamphleteer
he has little time or space to waste and accordingly has an obligation to present
his ideas lucidly, coherently and concisely. Because Justice Douglas attempts too
much, he does too little and fails on all three counts. Thus, in the second
chapter, entitled "Legions of Dissent," we are offered little more than a catalogue
of the following disparate matters of public interest: (1) Japan's twin fears of
Russia and of a war between the United States and China; (2) President
Johnson's war in Vietnam; (3) the lack of deterrent capability in our nuclear
weaponry; (4) the President vis-a-vis the Pentagon; (5) the China lobby;
(6) the budget of the Department of Defense; (7) the problems of the Black;
(8) the problems of the Mexican; (9) our bias against the poor as expressed in
our vagrancy, consumer credit, garnishment and landlord-tenant laws; (10) the
ecological crises (with special emphasis on West Virginia); (11) the evils of
government bureaucracy; (12) violence as a part of the tradition of our country;
and (13) the role of dissenters as the loyal opposition. With twenty-two pages in
which to present the subject matter, Justice Douglas could barely do more than
trot through the titles. How much better it would have been had he taken one
point (hopefully somewhat related to the rest of the book) and given it more than
a passing nod. One of the great questions of our day is: To what extent can the
loyal opposition dissent and still remain loyal? In Concerning Dissent and Civil
Disobedience Justice Fortas gave a partial answer, but the nature of the dissent
has changed so significantly in two years that another serious discussion ex
cathedra would not have been improper. Unfortunately Points of Rebellion does
not offer such a discussion.
It is not until his final chapter, "A Start Toward Reconstructing Our
Society," that Justice Douglas's presentation takes on any semblance of meaning
or order. There we are told that the vital problems "will require a great re-
structuring of our society"' and that in order to make this restructuring as non-
violent as possible we must devote our immediate attention to (1) reallocating
our resources (to be achieved primarily by reducing our military budget, closing
tax loopholes and generally taking away our direct subsidies to the "rich" farmer,
shipper, broadcaster and publisher in order to provide the necessary monies to
3 For a particularly good discussion of the importance of privacy in a free society, the
technology and techniques being used to probe into man's private life and the constitutional
limitations of the invasion, see A. WESTIN, PRIvACY AND FREM OM (1967).
4 W. DOUGLAS, supra note 1, at 33.
5 Perhaps a better title for the chapter would have been "How America Reacts to and
Controls Those Who Are Likely to Dissent-and How Those Who Want to Dissent React to
America."
6 W. DOUGLAS, supra note 1, at 63.
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subsidize the "poor") ;' and (2) creating control or surveillance ovei key admin-
istrative agencies, particularly, those agencies which should, but are not, giving
attention to improving the quality of our environment.
Because we have not done enough to reallocate our resources or control
our official bureaucracy, Justice Douglas finds that "[t]he use of violence as an
instrument of persuasion is therefore inviting and seems to the discontented to
be the only effective protest."8 Justice Douglas does not say (at least not directly)
that resort to violence is the only effective means of protest, but rather he says
that to some in our society this appears to be the case. To be sure, to the disciples
of Herbert Marcuse protest cannot be effective unless it is violent for, they say,
the existing structure is essentially rotten. Justice Douglas would have us do that
which is necessary to provide assurance that the voice of the disenchanted does
not have to be shouted in anger to be heard. With this noble effort one can
hardly disagree.
A single question to which Justice Douglas might have profitably directed
his book is whether fundamental changes in a political system can be achieved
in a rational, orderly manner-whether we can rely on "rebellion" to bring about
the reallocation of our resources and control of our governing bodies he views as
so important. While I think that Justice Douglas is hopeful that such is still
the case in America today, he secretly wishes that he had more to rely on than
hope. Despite its promise, Points of Rebellion adds very little, if anything, to our
knowledge about why there is discontent and does not really offer anything con-
structive with respect to how that discontent might be presented in a rational,
orderly manner. What is offered instead is an agenda on which urgent and
positive action must be taken,9 and even though the print is large and the pages
are few, one must swallow an incredible amount of pap to get to even this small
amount of meat.
Some books, like some book reviews, are better left unwritten-and Points
of Rebellion is one of those books. I say this as an admirer of Justice Douglas and
as one who would prefer that when he and other members of the judiciary write
outside the pages of official reports, they publish something more than random
thoughts and ideas in first-draft form. On-the book's inner jacket, the publisher
notes that it is the first of a trilogy "dealing with dissent and rebellion." One
would hope that as Justice Douglas writes the second and third installments he
does not feel obliged to follow the pattern of the first.
Paul F. Eckstein*
7 In this regard justice Douglas thinks it imperative that the' public sector be the employer
of last resort.
8 W. DOUGLAS, supra note 1, at 78.
9 The proposals put forth by Justice Douglas are: (1) reduction of "the budget of the
Pentagon" from 80 billion to 20 billion dollars; (2) lawyers for the "poor and disadvantaged";
'(3) revision of laws so as to eliminate their present bias against the poor; (4) exposure of
important decisions of federal agencies to public criticism before they are put into effect; (5)
revision of the food program; (6) creation of public sector employment with "meaningful and
valuable work"; (7) substitution of faculties and students for the "CIA and Pentagon" as the
controlling forces in the universities; and (8) continuation of the battle of "equality of oppor-
tunity" for the Blacks. W. DouGLAs, supra note 1, at 93-94.
* Member, Arizona Bar; A.B., Pomona College, 1962; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1965.
Mr. Eckstein is a partner in the firm of Brown, Vlassis and Bain in Phoenix, Arizona. ,
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PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS. By Ted Honderich. New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World. 1969. Pp. 202. $6.50.
Ted Honderich, the dust-jacket tells us, teaches philosophy. This should not
immediately prejudice the reader against what the author has to say. But when
the author confirms the prejudices the reader has tried to control, one is tempted
to say, "I told you so." I finished the book with a high esteem of the problem
and a low esteem of those who approach it as a verbal game. One has only to
confront the efforts of a lingual analyst, as here portrayed, with the trenchant dis-
section of the same problem by Camus, say in The Stranger or The Fall, to dis-
cover that there are at least two types of men we call philosophers: those who
examine the words men use to describe life and those who examine life itself.
But let us not dismiss the efforts of linguistic philosophers out of hand without
recalling the fragile dependence of the law on the words to achieve justice. The
essays of the British legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart have made a significant
contribution to our understanding of such concepts as "cause" and "responsi-
bility."' Mr. Honderich refers to a number of other British scholars whose
passion for logic has helped clarify several important problems for those interested
in the question of criminal punishment.2 Perhaps it is fair to say that one rather
comes to expect the British to express deep emotion in a turn of phrase and burn
with passion over the moral dilemma of punishment by a precisely honed argu-
ment. It would be dangerous to deny moral concern to men of obvious integrity
and intellectual capacity.
But when it comes to discussing punishment, one is dealing with a vitally
human problem which demands more than logic. In essence we are asking of
ourselves an explanation of why we, as an organized body of people, have chosen
through the years to apply this particular means of gaining social conformity.
We no longer use the quaint gibbet iron3 to extort conformity, but twenty years
in a prison will do as a substitute. Nor is it the fact that we are dealing with
physical suffering alone. While the Cat went out as a means of punishment
some time ago, the use of social degradation causes a deeper pain. The reason
why logic breaks down in the face of such a situation is that criminal justice, when
dispensed to a person who has intentionally caused harm to others in property or
person, must evoke all of the emotions of man from hatred to pity. It is not a
coldly objective process in which detached scientists quietly observe phenomena
and apply exact formula for precise results. On the other hand, it cannot be a
victim-centered retaliation in hot blood. It is, strangely, a medley of the reactive
and objective qualities in human relations which Strawson uses to describe our
attitudes toward those who are responsible and those who are not.'
1 H. HART & A. HORACE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959); H. HART, PUNISHMENT
AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).
2 For a recent summary of these authors, see Gerber & McAnany, The Philosophy of
Punishment in THE SOCIOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT AND CORRECTIONS at 337 (1970).
3 For those who fancy the lore of our obscene past, Thorsten Sellin has described what
our forefathers did to criminals in and around the City of Brotherly Love. Sellin, The Phila-
delphia Gibbet Iron, 46 J. GRIM. L.C. & P.S. 11 (1955).
4 Strawson, Freedom and Resentment in PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY (1962).
See T. HONDERicH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 115-23 (1969).
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All of which returns me-to the positive note about the author which I made
at the beginning. The subject matter of the book is of extreme value for con-
temporary society. As society makes demands upon itself for change at a rapid
rate, there is bound to be a continuing series of social crises that seem best solved
by the ordinary means of social disapproval: criminal punishment. But as we
most recently witnessed in the Chicago Seven trial, the criminal justice system
may not be the best or only means to gain order. The moral justification of
using the coercive means of criminal law (and here I would include the total
process of indictment, trial and punishment) is an important one for us because
it makes us answer other fundamental questions about the individual and society.
Perhaps no other issue can bring us, if we are willing to go, as quickly to the
ethical foundations of our society.
Mr. Honderich's book takes up three traditional justifications: retribution,
deterrence, and reformation. He devotes a chapter to each and adds a chapter
on the critical state of the compromise among those in a contemporary move-
ment toward a pluralistic justification. He adds two other chapters to the book
which deal with the arguments about free will and determinism and the exact
meaning of Mill's principle of governmental non-intervention. These latter relate
at best only obliquely to the thesis of the book.
My criticism of the author's analysis of retribution is that it ends exactly
where Professor Stanley Benn says all retributivists would end once they under-
take an explanation: as disguised utilitarians.5 Mr. Honderich says that retribu-
tion in criminal justice is nothing more than the satisfaction of the victim-
grievance. This satisfaction is brought about by the punishment of the criminal
offender, not because he deserves it, as most traditional retributivists say, but
simply because the victim is requited by the suffering of the punished criminal.
It is, in its own way, a utilitarian analogue of the metaphysical argument ad-
vanced by Hegel that punishment is a restoration of right through a process of
negation of evil. In any event the author in no place confronts or grasps the
meaning of desert or free choice of social evil. Indeed, at this point in the book'
and at others, he regrets the moral significance of responsibility.' This seems very
strange for a person who devotes a chapter to rescuing human freedom from the
determinists on the basis of morality."
The chapter on deterrence grasps the significance of the critical lack of
statistical data to support the thesis that criminal punishment restrains socially
deviant behavior. What data there is speaks of the failures in the system where
deterrence did not work. But the author correctly argues that the supposition
that deterrence is a myth because there is little positive evidence of its working is
itself myth-making. Professor Zimring has analyzed the current state of evidence
5 S. BENN & R. PETERS, SOCIAL PRINCIPLES AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE 177 (1959).
6 "It [culpability] seems not to be a moral reason for action at all, good or bad. The fact,
takenentirely by itself, that a man has caused a certain harm by a responsible action, seems to
have no moral consequences." T. HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS
32 (1969).
7 Id. at 72 and 161.
8 See id. at ch. 4 ("Freedom"). His argument that determinism is in logical conflict with
judgment is well developed. Id. at 123-30. But if punishment is itself a moral judgment, taken
in the sense of denunciation, then the author should have recognized his contradiction and have
opted for his argument as developed here.
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in the deterrence debate and has made similar common-sense and cautionary
arguments in favor of continued research on the subject.'
The author devotes the main part of his chapter, rightly I believe, to dealing
with the moral dilemma of punishment of the innocent under a deterrence
system in which the sole justification of punishment is its ability to deter others
from crime. Honderich argues that in some cases (more logical than real) victim-
ization might be justified where the benefit to others was great and the detriment
to the innocent sufferer was minimal (the Benthamite "economical" deterrent).
We can all imagine a case where a court would convict an innocent man because
of the great benefits to law and order. In the Dreyfus case, the benefits to
France's anti-Semitic patriotism were great and the cost to Captain Dreyfus
was-well, negligible. Very few deterrists are willing to go this route with
Honderich and he himself concedes that his point is more a debater point than a
telling argument. He ends by leaving the deterrist in a quandary by asserting that
punishment has to be justified by more than utility.
Reformation as a justification of punishment takes two forms: one argues
that punishment itself reforms and is thus justified; the other, that treatment
reforms and should be substituted for punishment which is never justified. The
author raises the problem for the punishment reformists that they may be using
it to indoctrinate. But that charge is at least as valid against the treatment-
reformists, if not more so, when techniques such as psychotropic drug therapy and
operant conditioning are used.
There have been several serious efforts to bring the conflicting goals of
punishment into a coherent rationale of justification. The author gives special
attention to that offered by Professor H. L. A. Hart.1 0 Hart argues that punish-
ment might have a different justification for different questions asked about it.
Thus, he says, we can ask the general question of what are we trying to accomplish
-what is the general justifying aim? To that question we must give the utilitarian
answer: to prevent crime. But we can go on to ask whom we shall punish and
we must answer: only the guilty. This is iL limitation which we place on the gen-
eral aim and is called "punishment in distribution." Its justification is based
firmly on desert, which is criminal responsibility.
For anyone who has read the recent writings of Hart carefully, one feature
is evident: the insistence on criminal responsibility.1 But Honderich seems to
ignore this or, when he does confront the issue in Hart, he argues weakly that
moral justification cannot rest upon freedom of choice. 2 This is consistent with
his earlier denial of moral significance to freedom. However, the centrality of
freedom, responsibility and culpability to our Western approach to criminal law
9 F. ZIMRING, PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE (to be published by the National Institute
on Mental Health in the very near future).
10 T. HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS ch. 1 ("Prolegomenon
to the Principles of Punishment") (1969); H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY
(1968).
11 H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY chs. 2 and 4-9 (1968). Lady Barbara
Wootton is the target of much of the Hartian criticism. See B. WOOTTON, CRIME AND CRIM-
INAL LAW (1963). Her point is somewhat different from the pure determinist in that Lady
Wootton feels that intent may have some significance after a determination of guilt in devising
a plan of rehabilitation.
12 T. HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFIATIONS 161 (1969).
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and punishment is acknowledged by some of its severest critics, such as Lady
Wootton. 3
When one finishes the book and asks at last what, for Ted Honderich, does
justify criminal punishment, the answer must be an odd type of victim-revenge
which seems to be based on the principle of fairness and utility. The author
may, in his own abstract way, be acknowledging what practical people have said
all along: retaliation cannot be entirely eliminated from our treatment of crim-
inals. But what others will admit as an enduring evil, he seems to exalt in the
general principle justifying punishment. The book omits any mention of the
denunciatory theory of punishment which is the contemporary choice of retrib-
utivist-minded persons as a leading explanation of punishment 4
From the point of view of an ordinary reader, the book will make for
difficult reading. Not only is there the problem of trying to focus the attention
of a mind blurred by daily visual media such as television on precise, logical argu-
ments, but Honderich has an irritating habit of interrupting himself in the midst
of an argument to "clear the ground" for the argument he is giving. As the
author says on the verge of such an excursion: "We lose nothing, given the pur-
poses of the present discussion, if we discuss the proposal -before us in this
way... ." I would counter, "We lose nothing-except the reader." Let me end
as I began. The subject matter is of great importance and is still in search of an
author to tell us why we so often ignore the ethical implications in applying
punishment.
Patrick D. McAnany*
13 B. WOOrTON, CIME AND CRIMINAL LAw (1963). Herbert Packer has written an
admirable book that defends staunchly the criminal system of culpability. H. PACteR, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).
14 See Hart, Aims of Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 401 '(1958); N. WALKER,
THE AIMs OF A PNAL SYSTEM 25-29 (1966).
15 T. HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 157 '(1969).
* Professor of Law, on leave, St. Louis University; -A.B.,_Rockhurst, 1951; LL.B., Harvard,
1960. Mr. McAnany is currently serving as Project Director for the Council for the Diagnosis
and Evaluation of Criminal Defendants in Chicago.
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Alfred A. Knopf. 1970. Pp. xiv, 478. $10.00.
THE APPORTIONMENT CASES. By Richard C. Cortner. A study of the strategy,
tactics, and procedures of constitutional litigation as developed in two
principal apportionment cases. Knoxville: The University of Tennessee
Press. 1970. Pp. ix, 283. $10.95.
CIVIL RIGHTS: A CURRENT GUIDE TO PEOPLE, ORGANIZATIONS AND EVENTS. By
A. John Adams and Joan Martin Burke. A reference handbook which
provides information on key people in the civil rights movement. New
York: R. R. Bowker Co. 1970. Pp. viii, 194. $9.95.
DEFENDING BUSINESS AND WHITE COLLAR CRIMES: FEDERAL AND STATE. By
F. Lee Bailey and Henry B. Rothblatt. Two superb trial attorneys take
the reader through the entire criminal process, discussing white collar
crime in general and specialized discussion of several specific crimes,
including embezzlement, mail fraud and perjury. Rochester, N.Y.:
Lawyer's Co-op. 1969. Pp. xxviii, 670. (Price unreported.)
HANDBOOK OF LEGAL MEDICINE. By Alan R. Moritz and R. Crawford Morris.
Saint Louis: The C. V. Mosby Company. 1970. Pp. xiii, 238. $8.75.
JEROME FRANK: JURIST AND PHILOSOPHER. By J. Mitchell Rosenberg, Ph.D.
A study of the jurisprudential writings and judicial opinions of the late
Judge Jerome Frank of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. New York:
Philosophical Library Inc. 1970. Pp. xviii, 274. $8.75.
THE LIMITS OF STATE ACTION. By W. Von Humboldt. The author examines
the propriety of state action and its relation to stifling individual freedom
and growth, mandating conformity, regulating moral and ethical develop-
ment, protecting the citizenry from deviant members (criminal law) and
providing for those who are unable to take care of themselves (welfare
and mental health law). New York: Cambridge University Press. 1969.
Pp. xliii, 143. $7.50.
NARCOTICS CASES: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE. Edited by Brian Freeman.
A companion sourcebook to DRUNK DRIVING CASES. New York:
Practising Law Institute. 1970. Pp. xxxi, 1172. (Price unreported.)
THE POLITICS OF LOCAL JUSTICE. Edited by James R. Klonoski and Robert
I. Mendelsohn. A civil-rights oriented discussion of legal problems on the
local level. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1970. Pp. xxii, 255 (paper-
bound). $3.95.
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REBELLION, RACISm, AND REPRESENTATION. By P. A. Dionisopoulos. A study
of the Adam Clayton Powell case and its antecedents. DeKalb, Illinois:
Northern Illinois University Press. 1970. Pp. x, 175. (Price unreported.)
A REPORT ON DENMARK'S LEGALIZED PORNOGRAPHY. Edited by Gordon
Schindler. In a rather explicit book, the editor includes a series of inter-
views with prominent Danes, Gallup Polls on freeing pornography, and
Pornography Reports of the Danish Penal Code Council. Torrance,
Calif.: Banner Books. 1969. Pp. 528. (Price unreported.)
THE R OSENBLUTH CASE: FEDERAL JUSTICE ON TRAL. By Rosemary Reeves
Davies. Ames, Iowa: The Iowa State University Press. 1970. Pp. xxii,
252. (Price unreported.)
THE TRL. oF THE CATONSVILLE NINE. By Daniel Berrigan, S.J. Boston:
Beacon Press. 1970. Pp. xi, 122. $5.95.
WAR CRIMES AND THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE. Edited by Erwin Knoll and
Judith Nies McFadden. An edited transcript of a Congressional Con-
ference on War and National Responsibility which convened in 1970.
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1970. Pp. xiv, 208.
$2.95 paper, $5.95 cloth.
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